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THE LATEST DECISION AT THE HAGUE.
Some legal decisions are of importance because of the amounts,
others because of the principles involved. Though the amount
involved in the case of the "Allied Powers" v. the "Peace Powers,"
recently decided by the international tribunal at the Hague, was
small, the principle involved in the decision thereof is one of vital
importance. In fact it would be difficult to select a legal question
the decision of which would affect more closely the peace, the
happiness and the progress of mankind.
The facts in the case are briefly these: Venezuela was indebted
to several nations, and owing to internal revolutions she had not
the money to pay these debts as they came due. Germany, England
and Italy grew impatient and formed a coalition for the purpose
of resorting to force in order to collect what they claimed was
due them. Their combined navies proved superior to that of Ven-
ezuela, and after blockading certain of her ports and bombarding
others, their superior force induced the helpless Republic to sign
a protocol providing for the payment of their claims out of her
customs receipts. At this point the United States intervened diplo-
matically and secured an agreement upon the part of all the cred-
itors of Venezuela to submit their claims to arbitration and to
refer to the international court at the Hague the question as to
whether or not the Allied Powers should have a preference over
the others in the payment of their claims. And it may not be
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out of place to stop long enough at this point to say that this
triumph is among the most brilliant in American diplomacy. It
increased the influence of the Hague tribunal and gave it an op-
portunity to establish a precedent which would be of such useful-
ness to the nations of the earth as to make them debtors unto it
for all coming time. That it did not avail itself of this opportunity
was no fault of the United States.
It is evident from the above facts that the parties in interest
before the Arbitration Boards at Caracas for the purpose of deter-
mining the amount of the claims were the several creditor nations
on the one hand and Venezuela on the other; but at the Hague the
parties were those nations which had resorted to force against
Venezuela and those which had not. To Venezuela it made no
financial difference whether the Allied Powers secured a preference
in the time of payment or whether they did not, as 30 per cent
of the custom receipts of two of her principal ports are to be applied
to the payment of the debts in question until the same are ex-
tinguished.
As the judges in the Court at the Hague do not hold office per-
manently as do the judges of most courts, it became necessary to
select for this case three from the list of those already nominated
by the various nations. The selection was made by the Czar of
Russia. He chose M. de Martens, Count Muravieff and Henri
Lammasch, the first two being Russians and the third an Austrian.
Count Muravieff was made chairman, and it was he who delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The issue in the case before the Court was clearly this: Is a
resort to force such a meritorious thing that it gives to the nation
or nations resorting to it early a preferred standing in a Court
created for the purpose of maintaining international peace andjustice? The Allied Powers maintained the affirmative, and the
others, to wit: Holland, Belgium, Norway and Sweden, Denmark
Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, France and the United States main-
tained the negative of this issue. Never before has a lawsuit in-
cluded so many important nations as parties litigant.
It is difficult to see how a court established for the purpose of
furthering the peace of the world could decide this issue in the
affirmative and thus put a premium upon violence. But such was
the decision of the court. A glance at the make-up of the com-
mittee of judges will help us somewhat in understanding the decision
handed down by them. It is impossible for men, even when sitting
as international arbitrators, to divest themselves of inherited ideas
and methods of thinking. The national ideas afloat in the atmos-
phere will soak in and become an indissoluble part of a man's
mental equipment. It is therefore natural that both the Russians
and the Austrian should bring to the bench full-grown convictions
as to the efficacy of force as a factor in the government of mankind
and not equally enlarged conceptions as to the rights of weaker
nations.
COMMENT.
Undoubtedly the judges had the right to decide in accordance
with their own convictions as to the law and equities in the case.
But it is unfortunate that they could not have reacled a different
conclusion. Therefore. it seems to us that it would have been
better in the present instance to have selected judges from countries
where the "mailed fist" is not quite so much an object of worship
as it is in Russia and Austria. As the rules of the court rendcr
ineligible judges from those countries which are parties to the con-
troversy, the number of countries from which judges could have
been chosen was very much narrowed in this case, yet it would still
have been possible to choose them from such countries as Switzer-
land, Greece or Portugal, i.e., from countries which would have the
least incentive to render a decision which would exalt brute force
over peaceful methods as a means for settling international con-
troversies.
The most encouraging thing in connection with the decision is
the almost universal disgust with which it has been received; a
disgust which is not an outgrowth of a sense of loss due to the
postponement of the time at which certain claims shall be paid, for
the amounts are so small that the financial loss is felt to be in-
siderable, but arises rather from the fact that a peace court should
have placed its seal of approval upon the methods of the swash-
buckler, and discourage in so far as it had the power to discourage
a reliance upon the peaceful methods of diplomacy. Another
encouraging feature is that, having agreed to submit the matter for
arbitration, there is no disposition not to abide by the award, not-
withstanding the almost universal disapproval of its terms. This
acquiescence rests upon the general conviction that, even though a
tribunal of justice may at time make mistakes, it is upon the whole
preferable to the tribunal of arms.
Apologists for the decision attempt to justify it upon the ground
of an analogy between the preferences given in courts of law tojudgment creditors over ordinary creditors and the preference given
in this case to the Allied Powers over the Peace Powers. At first
blush this analov seems sound. But let us examine it a little more
closely. Whatever preference a judgment creditor has over his
fellow-creditors he has secured not by forcibly seizing his debtor
by the throat or by seizing or destroying or threatening to seize or
destroy his property and thus compelling him to sign an agreement
under duress, but rather by virtue of the fact that he has submitted
his claim for judicial adjudication and has in advance of his fellow-
creditors established the fact that he has a valid claim. Had the
Allied Powers secured an award from an arbitration tribunal, while
the other creditor nations were doing nothing, they could then with
reason claim a preference in the payment of the amounts due them.
They would then stand in a position analogous to that of judgment
creditors. The giving of a preference as a reward for such a course
of conduct would not be saying to the nations of the earth: If thy
neighbor owe thee anything lose no time in proceeding against him
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with shot and shell lest some other nation anticipate thee and cause
the payment of thy claim to be postponed until he shall have first
been satisfied. In other words, it would not be promulgating the
dangerous doctrine of shoot first and arbitrate afterwards.
If we were to admit that technically the law would permit of
the decision rendered in the present case, we should still be forced
to insist that the equitable rights of the parties demanded a different
decision. The Court evidently took the view that it was a court
of law only and not a court of equity as well. This is most un-
fortunate and will be especially so if it is followed as a precedent
for future decisions. For, if this is not to be a court of equity as
well as of common law jurisdiction, what provision is left for equity
jurisdiction in 'the field of international justice? If there is in
municipal law need for a "correction of that wherein the law by
reason of its universality is inadequate," there is certainly an equal
if not greater need for it in international law. Had the equities
of the case been considered, the Court would not have held that the
protocol of February i5th executed under duress was a sufficient
basis upon which to rest a decision, and particularly as one of the
conditions upon which the case was submitted to the Court was
that said protocol should not be considered binding. That such
is the fact appears from an impartial study of the negotiations.
Viewing the case as a whole, this much is certain: That if
adherence to the rules of international law necessitated the decision
rendered in this case, then there is an imperative need of a con-
ference of the nations to amend the law upon this point. For it is
inconsistent and irrational to hold, as civilized nations do, that peace
is a thing to be fostered and at the same time enforce a rule in a
peace court which encourages a resort to war.
Edain Maxey.
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